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Abstract This paper uses an extended version of “FiMod—A DSGE Model for Fis-
cal Policy Simulations” (Stähler and Thomas Econ Model 29:239–261, 2012) with
endogenous job destruction decisions by private firms to analyze the effects of sev-
eral currently discussed labor market reforms on the Spanish economy. The main
focus is on the firms’ hiring and firing decisions, on the implications for fiscal bal-
ances and on Spain’s international competitiveness. We find that measures aiming at
reducing (policy-induced) outside option of workers, such as a decrease in unemploy-
ment benefits, public wages or, to a lesser extent, public-sector employment, seem
most beneficial to foster output, employment, international competitiveness and fiscal
balances. Decreasing the unions’ bargaining power also accomplishes this task. Our
simulation suggests that reforming employment protection legislation does not seem to
be a suitable tool from the perspective of improving international competitiveness. All
measures imply (income) redistribution between optimizing and liquidity-constrained
consumers. Our analysis also suggests that those reforms that are beneficial for Spain
generate positive spillovers to the rest of EMU, too.
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1 Introduction
“The global financial crisis triggered an adjustment in the Spanish real estate sec-
tor which had serious consequences for the labor market. Since the beginning of the
crisis, more than 2 million jobs have been destroyed (...) raising the unemployment
rate above 20%” (see National Reform Programme Spain 2011, p. 15).1 Evidently,
the current crisis greatly affected the Spanish labor market. But even in “good times”
Spain’s unemployment rate was well above the EU average and hardly below around
10 %, which hints at some general structural weaknesses. On the labor market, high
employment protection and strong unions, among other things, are said by many to
have led to disproportionately increasing wage claims, thereby deteriorating Spain’s
competitiveness vis-á-vis the rest of the monetary union member countries (see, for
example, IMF 2011). In order now to tackle these problems, the Spanish government
has—after consultation with the European Commission and the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) as well as remarkable demonstrations by primarily young citizens in
basically any major city—chosen job creation and the reformation of the labor market
to become a core goal of economic policy. In this paper, we analyze the short and
long-run impact of making the Spanish labor market “more flexible” on output, unem-
ployment, international competitiveness and fiscal balances using an extended version
of “FiMod—A DSGE Model for Fiscal Policy Simulations” developed by Banco de
España and Deutsche Bundesbank staff for policy simulations.2
The present paper has two objectives. First, we evaluate proposed measures to
reform the Spanish labor market—more precisely, a permanent cut in employment
protection, constantly weakening trade unions as well as a permanent cut in unem-
ployment benefits, public wages and public-sector employment—in a medium-scale
dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Second, more on the tech-
nical side, we propose a way how to simultaneously introduce endogenous dismissal
decisions by firms and liquidity-constrained consumers in a medium-scale DSGE
framework.
DSGE models have recently been more widely used for such analyses as they allow
to present arguments in a rather structural way and give some numerical assessment,
too. A non-exhaustive overview of papers related to ours are, among others, Zanetti
(2011), who finds in a related DSGE model that labor market institutions significantly
affect the volatility of output, employment and job flows (negatively for employment
protection, positively for unemployment benefits). Thomas and Zanetti (2009) find
in a DSGE model with large firms that the effects of such labor market institutions
on inflation volatility are rather small. Similarly, Merkl and Schmitz (2011) find that
labor market institutions affect inflation volatility to a rather small extent, but they
identify significant effects on output volatility. By contrast, Campolmi and Faia (2011)
find unemployment benefits to significantly decrease inflation volatility. They, hence,
1 Publicly available at the homepage of the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Economics: http://www.meh.
es/Documentacion/National%20Reform%20Programme%202011%20Spain.pdf.
2 The model has been used in the Working Group on Econometric Modelling (WGEM) of the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) to simulate various fiscal consolidation measures for Spain (see Stähler
and Thomas 2012).
123
SERIEs (2013) 4:437–471 439
explain inflation differentials in the euro area by differences in the generosity of the
unemployment insurance system. Almeida et al. (2010) address the effects of labor
and product market reforms on international competitiveness for Portugal in PESSOA,
the DSGE model used by the Portuguese National Bank. A similar analysis can be
found in Kilponen and Ripatti (2006) using the Finnish model, in Deák et al. (2011)
using the LSM (the Luxembourg Structural Model) and in Krause and Uhlig (2012)
analyzing Germany’s so-called Hartz IV reforms. These analyses find that, in general,
labor market reforms improve competitiveness, foster domestic output and play a part
in lowering unemployment. They address labor market reforms only as a cut in the
“wage markup” (Almeida et al. 2010; Kilponen and Ripatti 2006) or as a decrease in
unemployment benefits (Deák et al. 2011; Krause and Uhlig 2012), however, while
we can be somewhat more specific on various measures to be analyzed. Related to
this literature, the contribution of the paper at hand is its focus on the effects of
specific structural labor market reforms on international competitiveness and fiscal
balances.
FiMod, the model we use to analyze these questions, is a two-country monetary
union DSGE model with a comprehensive fiscal block that includes a wide range of
taxes and quite some disaggregation in government spending. Furthermore, it includes
the modern theory of unemployment, extending the model of Stähler and Thomas
(2012) by endogenizing job destruction along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994, 1999, 2003) and Zanetti (2011). Our findings from the model simulations can
be summarized as follows.
A decrease in workers’ outside option through a decrease in unemployment bene-
fits or public-sector wages and a decrease in union’s bargaining power unambiguously
decreases private-sector wage claims and makes it more attractive for firms to cre-
ate jobs. Because of lower labor costs, firms decide to dismiss fewer people, which
decreases unemployment. Furthermore, they lower prices. The latter makes Span-
ish goods cheaper, which fosters exports and improves the terms of trade. Higher
production and less unemployment improve fiscal balances. Additionally, they are
directly affected by the fact that a cut in the policy-induced expenditure item (unem-
ployment benefits and the public sector wage bill) immediately decreases expendi-
tures. According to our model simulations, these measures have the highest impact
on output, employment, international competitiveness and fiscal balances compared
to the other measures. In principle, the argumentation also holds for a cut in pub-
lic employment. However, given that higher private labor demand cannot compen-
sate for the decrease in public employment, unemployment will increase. This, first,
diminishes the magnitude of the positive effects resulting from the other two mea-
sures just described and, second, may induce firms to dismiss relatively unproductive
workers more frequently and to search for more productive ones in the pool of unem-
ployed workers, even though this is costly. As unemployment has increased, search
costs may fall to a sufficient extent for such behavior to pay off from the firms’
perspective.
Our model simulation suggests that a cut in employment protection is not an ade-
quate measure to tackle problems related to international competitiveness. Indeed,
job creation increases as the expected cost of getting rid of a worker falls. How-
ever, dismissal probability also increases. On average, workers demand higher wages,
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partly to compensate for the additional dismissal risk, partly because average produc-
tivity of employed workers rises due to a rise in the dismissal productivity thresh-
old. Hence, labor costs rise. In order to tackle this, firms increases prices, which
deteriorates the terms of trade and causes exports to fall. In our model simulation,
unemployment increases as the dismissal effect dominates the job creation effect.
The drop in internal and external demand additionally decreases output, contribut-
ing to lower labor demand. To put these findings into perspective, some remarks
seem in order. First, while reducing average dismissal costs in Spain may—according
to our analysis—not contribute to regaining international competitiveness, a reform
may still be in order. Spain is characterized by a dual labor market where some
benefit greatly from employment protection while others do not have any. Costain
et al. (2010) address this issue in a more adequate and very sophisticated model.
Also, the comparatively large informal sector may be an issue here. Second, the
bargaining game between the union and the firm may have quite an impact on the
results. In our model, we follow the standard approach in the matching literature.
However, Stähler (2008) has shown that the bargaining game matters. And last but
not least, modelling employment protection itself is quite a complicated issue and it
probably deserves a more sophisticated modelling than simply implementing firing
costs, the approach we followed in the model at hand. For an overview of the dif-
ferent aspects related to employment protection and a discussion, see, among others,
Stähler (2007).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Sect. 2. Sec-
tion 3 evaluates the labor market reforms already discussed. We differentiate between
short and long-run effects. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
FiMod is a two-country monetary union DSGE model with frictional labor markets and
a comprehensive fiscal block that includes a wide range of taxes and disaggregation
of government spending. Households, firms, policymakers and the external sector
interact each period by trading final goods, financial assets and production factors. In
this section we will briefly present the main characteristics of the model and discuss its
calibration to make the paper self-contained. Readers who are familiar with FiMod may
move on to the labor market section where the endogenous job destruction decision
of firms is described. For a complete account of the base model and a more detailed
discussion, see Stähler and Thomas (2012).
We start by describing the household sector in Sect. 2.1. Then, we turn to the produc-
tion sector in Sect. 2.2, while Sect. 2.3 details the labor market. Fiscal authorities are
described in Sect. 2.4, followed by a description of international linkages in Sect. 2.5.
The calibration strategy is explained in Sect. 2.6.
For what follows, we normalize population size of the monetary union to unity, of
which ω ∈ (0, 1) live in Spain, while the remaining (1 − ω) live in the rest of EMU.
Throughout the paper, quantity variables will be expressed in per capita terms, unless
otherwise indicated. Both regions are modeled analogously, while we allow structural
parameters to differ.
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2.1 Households
Following Galí et al. (2007), we assume that each country is populated by a share
(1 − μ) of optimizing (or Ricardian) households who have unrestricted access to
capital markets and are therefore able to substitute consumption intertemporally. The
remaining share μ ∈ [0, 1) of households is considered to be liquidity-constrained in
the sense that they can neither save nor borrow and consume all their labor income in
each period. Each household has a continuum of members of size one. The welfare











where Et is the expectations operator conditional on time-t information, cit denotes
household consumption of final goods, and the superscripts i = o, r denote optimizing
and rule-of-thumb households, respectively. The variable g˜t is government services
produced by public employees, which is taken as given by private households. The
instantaneous utility function is given by
u(cit , c
i




1−σc + ζ ·
g˜1−σct −1
1−σc , σc > 0, σc = 1
log
[
cit − h · cit−1
] + ζ · log[g˜t ], σc = 1 . (2)
The parameter σc is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, h denotes the degree
of habit formation in consumption, and ζ > 0 is a parameter capturing the relative
valuation of public consumption in the households’ utility function.
Inside each household, its members may be employed in the public sector, in the
private sector, or unemployed. We assume full consumption insurance within the
household, as in Andolfatto (1996) or Merz (1995). This holds both for Ricardian and
rule-of-thumb households; see also Boscá et al. (2009, 2010, 2011) and Stähler and
Thomas (2012) for a more detailed discussion.
We assume that both countries trade consumption and investment goods as well
as international nominal bonds. The consumption and investment baskets, cit and I
o
t ,
























demand of goods produced in country A (Spain) and B (rest of EMU), respectively, and
ψ is a parameter capturing the degree of home bias in consumption. Cost minimization
by the household implies
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xiAt
xiBt
= ω + ψ




where PAt and PBt are the producer price indexes (PPI) in countries A and B, respec-
tively. From now onwards, let
pBt ≡ PBt
PAt
denote the terms of trade. The above equations imply that nominal expenditure in
consumption and investment goods equal PAt ciAt + PBt ciBt = Pt cit and PAt I oAt +
PBt I oBt = Pt I ot , respectively, where
Pt = (PAt )ω+ψ(PBt )1−ω−ψ
is the corresponding consumer price index (CPI). Notice that Pt = PAt · p1−ω−ψBt .






where πAt ≡ PAt/PAt−1 is PPI inflation in country A.
2.1.1 Optimizing households
The budget constraint of the representative optimizing households in real terms is


























+(1−τw)(w pt n p,ot + wgt ng,ot )+(1−n p,ot −ng,ot )κ B . (3)







t , where w
p
t is the real wage paid in the private sector (to be derived later),
w
g




t are the number of
type-o household members employed in the private and government sector, respec-
tively. The labor income tax rate is denoted by τw. Unemployed household members
receive unemployment benefits κ B. τ c denotes the consumption tax rate. Investments
in physical capital kot earn a real rental rate r
k
t , while the capital depreciates at rate δ
k.
Returns on physical capital net of depreciation allowances are taxed at rate τ k. The
optimizing household can also purchase nominal government bonds Bot , which pay a
gross nominal interest rate Rt . Returns on government bonds are taxed at the rate τ b.
Finally, optimizing households can hold international nominal bonds, Dot . In order
to ensure stationarity of equilibrium, we follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and
assume that home agents pay a risk premium on top of the area-wide nominal policy
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rate, which we denote by Recbt . This implies that the nominal interest rate paid or
received by home investors is given by Recbt exp(−ψd(dt − d¯)/Yt ), with ψd > 0,
where dt ≡ Dt/PAt , Dt is the home country’s nominal net foreign asset position and
(−)dt/Yt is the ratio of net foreign debt over output. We assume for simplicity that
trading in international bonds is not taxed.3 	t are nominal per capita profits generated
by firms including vacancy posting costs. We assume that all firms are owned by the
optimizing households and that profits are redistributed in a lump-sum manner. Tt and
Subt are lump-sum taxes and subsidies, respectively.
The law of motion of private physical capital is given by:
kot = (1 − δk)kot−1 +
[






) = κI2 (I ot /I ot−1 − 1)2 represents investment adjustment costs (see
Christiano et al. 2005, for discussion). Maximizing (1) given (2) subject to Eqs. (3)
and (4) yields the following standard first-order conditions,
for cot : λot =
[
cot − h · cot−1
]−σc − β · h · Et {[cot+1 − h · cot ]−σc}
(1 + τ c) , (5)
for Bot : λot = β · Et
{
λot+1 ·









(1 − δk)Qt+1 + (1 − τ k) · rkt+1 + τ k · δk
]}
, (7)
for I ot : 1 = Qt
[




















where λot is the Lagrange multiplier on Eq. (3) and Qt · λot is the Lagrange multiplier
on Eq. (4). Therefore, λot represents the marginal utility of real income, whereas Qt
represents the shadow real price of a unit of physical capital, i.e. Tobin’s Q. We also
assume that the No-Ponzi condition on wealth is satisfied.
2.1.2 Non-Ricardian households
As non-Ricardian households can neither save nor borrow, their budget constraint
simplifies to
(1 + τ c)crt = (1 − τw)(w pt n p,rt + wgt ng,rt ) + (1 − n p,rt − ng,rt )κ B, (10)
3 Note also that this modelling strategy generates some sort of iceberg costs because the indebted country
pays a higher interest rate than the one the debtor country receives. However, this (non-microfounded) way
of modelling is common modelling practice in international macroeconomics.
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which determines rule-of-thumb consumption, crt . The corresponding marginal utility
of consumption for rule-of-thumb households is thus
λrt =
[crt − h · crt−1]−σc − β · h · Et
{[crt+1 − h · crt ]−σc}
(1 + τ c) . (11)
Note that RoT households are not taxed lump-sum. The reason for this is that, in what
follows, we are interested in the isolated effects of the labor market reforms discussed
below, and we want to avoid introducing additional distortions stemming from the
fiscal side. If we taxed RoTs, too, this would imply a change in their consumption
behavior, their discounting and, hence, would therefore affect the labor market as
we will see below. Therefore, we introduce this entirely non-distortionary lump-sum
tax levied on optimizers as a theoretical construct to highlight the fiscal leeway (or
shortage) resulting from the structural labor market reforms discussed below; see also
Sect. 2.4.
2.1.3 Aggregation
Given the above description, consumption per capita in the home country equals the
weighted average of consumption for each household type, i.e.
Ct = (1 − μ) · cot + μ · crt . (12)
For future reference, per capita domestic demand for the home country’s and the
foreign country’s consumption good equals CAt = (1 − μ)coAt + μcrAt and CBt =
(1 − μ)coBt + μcrBt , respectively. For the quantity variables that exclusively concern
optimizing households, per capita amounts are given simply by Zt = (1−μ)Zot , where
Zt ∈ {kt , Bt/Pt , It , Dt , IAt , IBt } and Zot ∈ {kot , Bot /Pt , I ot , Dot , I oAt , I oBt }. Employ-
ment aggregation will be described in the labor market section.
2.2 Production
The retail and intermediate goods sectors of the economy are similar to Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007) or Christiano et al. (2005), with the exception that labor ser-
vices are not hired directly from the households but from a sector of firms that
produce homogenous labor services in the manner of Christoffel et al. (2009) or
DeWalque et al. (2009). It is the latter firms that hire workers and bargain over wages
with them. In this subsection, we focus on the retail and intermediate goods sectors,
postponing the description of the labor market to the next subsection.
2.2.1 Retailers
There is a measure-ω continuum of firms in the retail (or final goods) sector. Each
retail firm purchases a variety of differentiated intermediate goods, bundles these into
a final good and sells the latter under perfect competition. We assume that the law of
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one price holds within the union, which means that the price of the home country’s
final good is the same in both countries and equal to PAt . The maximization problem
of the representative retail firm reads
max



















,  > 1, (14)
is the retailer’s production function, y˜t ( j) is the retailer’s demand for each differenti-
ated input j ∈ [0, ω], and PAt ( j) is the nominal price of each input. The first-order






. Combining the latter
with (13) and the zero profit condition, we obtain that the producer price index in the





PAt ( j)1−d j
)1/(1−)
. Notice that, since there
are ω retail firms, total demand for each intermediate input equals







Firms in the intermediate goods sector have mass ω. Each producer j ∈ [0, ω] operates
the following technology:
yt ( j) = a · (kgt−1)η · [k˜t ( j)]α · [lt ( j)](1−α), (16)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the elasticity of output with respect to private capital, lt ( j) denotes
the demand for labor services, k˜t ( j) is the demand for capital services and a is
TFP. kgt−1 is the public capital stock available in period t , which is determined by the
government and is assumed to be productivity-enhancing; the parameter η ∈ [0, 1)
measures how influential public capital is on private production (see Leeper et al. 2010,
for discussion). Intermediate goods firms acquire labor and capital services in perfectly
competitive factor markets at real (CPI-deflated) prices xt and rkt , respectively. In
period t , the real profits of firm j are thus given by PAt ( j)Pt yt ( j)− xt · lt ( j)− rkt · k˜t ( j).
Cost minimization subject to (16) implies the following factor demand conditions:
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where mct is the real (CPI-deflated) marginal cost common to all intermediate
good producers. Recall that constant returns to scale in private capital and labor,
together with perfectly competitive input prices, imply that the ratios yt ( j)/k˜t ( j) and
yt ( j)/ lt ( j) are equalized across firms.
We assume that intermediate goods firms set nominal prices á la Calvo (1983). Each
period, a randomly chosen fraction θP ∈ [0, 1) of firms cannot re-optimize their price.
A firm that has the chance to re-optimize its price in period t chooses the nominal

































Yt+z = 0, (20)
where P˜At is the optimal price chosen by all period-t price setters. The law of motion






+ (1 − θP ) p˜1−t , (21)
where p˜t ≡ P˜At/PAt is the relative (PPI-deflated) optimal price.
2.3 The labor market
Labor firms hire and fire workers from the household sector in order to produce
homogenous labor services, which they sell to intermediate goods producers at the
perfectly competitive price xt . This modelling strategy follows Christoffel et al. (2009).
We follow Zanetti (2011) to endogenize (private-sector) dismissals by including idio-
syncratic job-specific productivity shocks. Following the exposition of Pissarides
(2000), surplus calculations are carried out on a per-worker basis. The production func-
tion of each labor firm is linear in average idiosyncratic productivity by its employees,
which is given by havt and will be determined later in Sect. 2.3.2. Letting N
p
t denote
both the fraction of the labor force employed in the private sector and the per-capita
number of labor firms, the total per-capita supply of labor services is given by:
Lt = N Pt · havt . (22)
Equilibrium in the market for labor services requires that ωLt =
∫ ω
0 lt ( j)d j . Using
Eqs. (15) and (16), together with the fact that the capital–labor ratio is equalized across
intermediate goods firms (i.e. k˜t ( j)/ lt ( j) = kt−1/Lt for all j), the above condition can
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be expressed as Yt Dt = a(kgt−1)ηkαt−1L1−αt , where Dt ≡
∫ ω
0 ω
−1 (PAt ( j)/PAt )− d j
is a measure of price dispersion. In what follows, we will specify the matching process
and flows in the labor market, vacancy creation and job destruction as well as (private)
wage determination. Government wages and employment are autonomously chosen
by the fiscal authority (see Sect. 2.4).
2.3.1 Matching and dismissal processes and labor market flows
A worker can be in one of three states: (i) unemployed, (ii) employed in the public
sector, or (iii) employed in the private sector. Unemployment is the residual state in
the sense that a worker whose employment relationship ends flows back into unem-
ployment. Unemployed workers look for job opportunities. They find them either in
the public sector (with superscript g for government employment) or in the private
sector (with superscript p). Workers do not direct search to either the public or the
private sector and are, thus, matched randomly.
Let us denote sector-specific per capita employment in period t by N ft , where
f = p, g stands for private and public (i.e. government) employment, respectively.4
The total employment rate is then given by N tott = N pt +N gt , while the unemployment
rate is given by:
Ut = 1 − N tott . (23)
Following Blanchard and Galí (2010), we assume that the hiring round takes place at
the beginning of each period, and that new hires start producing immediately. We also
assume that workers dismissed at the end of period t − 1 start searching for a new job
at the beginning of period t . Therefore, the pool of searching workers at the beginning
of period t is given by:
U˜t = Ut−1 + s pt N pt−1 + sg N gt−1,
where sg represents the constant separation rate in the public sector. The separation
rate in the private sector, s pt , is time-varying as it depends on the dismissal decision
of firms. We will describe this in more detail in a moment.
The matching process is governed by a standard Cobb–Douglas aggregate matching
function for each sector f = p, g,
M ft = κ fe · (U˜t )ϕ f · (v ft )(1−ϕ f ), (24)
4 Note that, as we work with household type-specific (un)employment rates for each sector in the house-
holds’ budget constraints (see Eqs. (3) and (10), we basically have to aggregate employment in order
to obtain total (per capita) employment levels across public and private employment. This is done in
analogy to the aggregation of consumption decisions see Sect. 2.1.3; again implying that capital letters
indicate aggregate levels). Thus, aggregated per capita employment levels in each sector are given by
N ft = (1 − μ) · n f,ot + μ · n f,rt . Noting that dismissal and job-finding probabilities are equal across
household types, we have that N ft = n f,ot = n f,rt ; see also Moyen and Stähler (2013) for details.
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where κ fe > 0 is the sector-specific matching efficiency parameter, ϕ f ∈ (0, 1) the
sector-specific matching elasticity and M ft the number of new matches formed in
period t resulting from the total number of searchers and the number of sector-specific
vacancies v ft . Note that, by allowing for the possibility that ϕ
p = ϕg , the matching
process in the public and private sector may differ. The probability for an unemployed
worker to find a job in sector f can thus be stated as p ft = M ft /U˜t , while the
probability of filling a vacancy is given by q ft = M ft /v ft .
During each period t , the flow into unemployment from the private sector results
from an exogenous shock, sx , and from a shock to the idiosyncratic productivity of
active jobs, ht , leading to an endogenous job destruction probability snt = F(h˜t ) when
idiosyncratic productivity of an active job falls below some endogenously determined
threshold, h˜t . The exogenous separation probability sx —as well as the corresponding
probability in the public sector, sg—can be interpreted as an exogenous retirement rate
(see, for example, Costain et al. 2010). As described in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994,
1999, 2003), we assume that new matches are always endowed with a productivity
hnew > h˜t and, thus, that newly created jobs never separate for endogenous reasons
in the period they are created. Total private job separations are, hence, given by s pt =
sx + (1 − sx )snt . As is standard in the literature, we assume that the idiosyncratic
productivity shock will be log-normally distributed with log(ht ) ∼ N (μh, σh).
The law of motion for sector-specific employment rates is therefore given by:
N gt = (1 − sg) · N gt−1 + pgt · U˜t and N pt = (1 − s pt ) · N pt−1 + p pt · U˜t (25)
for the public (g) and the private (p) sector, respectively.5 Thus, sector-specific employ-
ment today is given by yesterday’s employment that has not been destroyed plus newly
created matches in that sector. For simplification, we assume that workers do not
receive offers from the public and the private sector simultaneously.
2.3.2 Asset value of jobs and wage bargaining
Because of search frictions, formed matches entail economic rents. A union bargains
with firms about the workers’ share of the overall match surplus. We assume that
there exists a median voter union which sets one wage, w pt , common for all workers
in the private sector. We detail the union below. In order to describe the bargaining
process, we first have to derive the asset value functions for workers and firms. The
present-discounted value of a firm hiring a newly matched worker can be expressed as:















5 Remember that private-sector job destruction is time-varying because of endogenous job destruction,
while public-sector job destruction is exogenously given.
123
SERIEs (2013) 4:437–471 449
where xt is the price the labor-goods firm charges for providing the labor service and
ht is the (productivity-weighted) “amount” of labor service provided by the labor firm.
It has to pay a wage w pt to the worker plus social security contributions to the state
at rate τ sc. Whenever the job is not destroyed next period at exogenous probability,
sx , a new idiosyncratic productivity is drawn from the distribution function F(ht ). If
this productivity is above the endogenously determined threshold value h˜t+1, the firm
earns the present-discounted value of a continuing job with the corresponding pro-
ductivity, i.e. Jt+1(ht+1). Whenever the productivity falls below the threshold, which
happens at (expected) probability F(h˜t+1), it has to pay a dismissal tax κF . Hence,
a job yields a net return xt ht − (1 + τ sc)w pt plus an expected present-discounted
net value Jt+1(ht+1) − F(h˜t+1)κF in the following period. Note that firms use the
marginal utility of optimizing households, λot , to discount future periods as we assume
that firms are owned by optimizers.
Opening a vacancy has a real (CPI-deflated) flow cost of κ pv . Free entry into the
vacancy posting market drives the expected value of a vacancy to zero (see Pissarides
2000). Under our assumption of instantaneous hiring, real vacancy posting costs, κ pv ,
must equal the time-t vacancy filling probability, q pt , times the expected value of a





= J newt . (27)
We can now derive the asset value functions of workers. In particular, we are
interested in the value of the job in excess of the value of being unemployed, i.e.
the worker’s match surplus. Since different household types use different stochastic
discount factors, we must distinguish between the surplus for an optimizing and a
rule-of-thumb household. For a worker belonging to a type-i household, the surplus
value of being employed in a continuing job in the private sector is given by:





[(1 − F(h˜t+1) − p pt+1)Hi,pt+1 − pgt+1 Hi,g]
}
(28)
for i = o, r (remember that there is a common private-sector wage w pt independent
of the worker’s individual productivity or type). The value of being employed in the
public sector can be stated as:








Hence, an employed worker receives a wage depending on which sector (private or
public) he works in. Additionally, he receives the option value of the job in case it
continues in the next period. The outside option of the worker—i.e. his forgone income
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of being unemployed—is the sum of unemployment benefits, κ B , and the expected
value of searching for a job in the following period, where p ft+1 is the probability of
finding a job in sector f = g, p. Conditional on landing on a private-sector job, the
surplus of the worker is the surplus of being newly employed in the private sector;
when landing on a public-sector job, it is the surplus of working in the public sector.
For an unemployed worker to be willing to work, it must always hold that Hi, ft > 0. In
the private sector, this always holds because of the bargaining game, while calibration
guarantees this to hold in the public sector, too.
As in Stähler and Thomas (2012), who follow Boscá et al. (2009, 2010, 2011),
private-sector wage bargaining is modelled as a Nash-bargaining game between a
union and the firm. We assume that the union imposes a perfectly egalitarian wage
among its members. Given that all workers are union member, we assume that the
wage is set through the median-voter theorem and is, hence, determined by the median
worker’s productivity level hmed . Formally, the union’s utility can be represented by
t ≡ (1 − μ)Ho,pt + μHr,pt . In the bargaining process, we have to take into account
that the median worker is an employed worker. Hence, in case of disagreement, firms
in will have to pay the dismissal tax, κF . The maximization problem is, therefore,
maxw pt [t ]ξ [Jt (hmed) + κF ]1−ξ . The resulting sharing rule is given by:
t = ξ
1 − ξ ·
1 − τw
1 + τ sc · [Jt (h
med) + κF ]. (30)
Solving Eq. (30) for the corresponding wage by using the appropriate firm and worker


















1−τw + t ,
(31)
where










(1 + τ sc)
+pgt+1
(1 − ξ)















(1 − F(h˜t+1) − p pt+1)Hr,pt+1 − pgt+1 Hr,gt+1
]}
is the expected future option value of the union. It includes the expected value of being
matched to a private or public job in the next period for unemployed workers and a
“union/Rot-smoothing” term (last term of the equation).6 The latter reminds us that
6 Note that gt = (1 − μ)Ho,gt + μHr,gt .
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there is risk sharing at the household level, but not between households. Although
optimizing and RoT households may have a different reservation wage, they pool
together in the labor market via the union structure and bargain with firms to distribute
employment according to their share in the population. This implies that all household
types receive the same wage and suffer the same unemployment rate. In contrast
to Galí et al. (2007), this means that although RoT consumers cannot use wealth
for consumption smoothing over time, they take advantage of the fact that a match
today is likely to continue in the future, yielding a labor income that will be used to
consume tomorrow. Therefore, unionized wage negotiations provide RoT consumers
the opportunity to improve their lifetime utility by narrowing the gap in utility with
respect to optimizing consumers (see also Boscá et al. 2010, 2011, for more details).
Note that this “union/Rot-smoothing” term is zero in steady state.
2.3.3 Job creation and job destruction conditions
As we have already noted in Eq. (27), vacancies are created as long as the value of a
newly created job equals average search costs. By substituting the above asset value
functions and wages and rearranging, we obtain




as the job creation condition (JC henceforth). Because, in equilibrium, jobs are
destroyed when the surplus the labor firm receives from the job falls below dismissal
costs, we note that the job destruction condition (JD henceforth) can be expressed as
Jt (h˜t ) = −κF . Substitution of wages and rearranging yields
xt · (h˜t − ζ · hmed) − (1 − ζ )1 + τ
sc
1 − τw κ
B +
(














(ht+1 − h˜t+1)d F(ht+1)
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ − (1 + τ sc) · t = 0.
(33)
As Zanetti (2011) has shown, the weight for continuing jobs is given by ωct =




, while that for newly created jobs is given by (1 − ωct ). The average






new, which we have also used in Eq. (22). Note that the integral term is average
productivity of continuing jobs.
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2.4 Fiscal authorities
The real (CPI-deflated) per capita value of end-of-period government debt, bt ≡
Bt/Pt , evolves according to a standard debt accumulation equation,
bt = Rt−1
πt
bt−1 + P Dt ,
where P Dt denotes real (CPI-deflated) per capita primary deficit. The latter is given









τw + τ sc) [w pt N Pt + wgt N gt ] + τ b Rt−1 − 1πt bt−1
+τ cCt + τ k(rkt − δk)kt−1 + Tt + (1 − sx ) · snt · N Pt · κF
]
, (34)
where Gt denotes per capita government spending in goods and services expressed in
PPI terms (hence the correction for the CPI-to-PPI ratio, Pt/PAt = p1−ω−ψBt ) and κgv
are public-sector vacancy costs. Government spending in goods and services is in turn
the sum of government demand for privately-produced consumption and investment
goods and the public sector wage bill (gross of social security contributions). Following
standard practice, we assume full home bias in public purchases and public investment,





denote real per capita public purchases and public investment, respectively, we have
the following nominal relationship: PAt Gt = PAt (Cgt + I gt ) + (1 + τ sc)Ptwgt N gt .
Dividing by PAt and using Pt/PAt = p1−ω−ψBt , we obtain
Gt = Cgt + I gt + [(1 + τ sc)wgt N gt ]p1−ω−ψBt . (35)
Note furthermore that we assume for simplicity that firing costs revert to the gov-
ernment, which is perfectly standard in the literature (see, for example, Thomas and
Zanetti 2009). Given public investment, the stock of public physical capital evolves
as follows:
kgt = (1 − δg)kgt−1 + I gt , (36)
where we assume that the public capital stock depreciates at rate δg .
Given that we treat tax rates as constant, the government has one fiscal instrument
on the revenue side: lump-sum taxes, Tt . It has five instruments on the expenditures
side: public purchases, Cgt , public investment, I
g
t , public sector wages, w
g
t , public
employment, N gt , and lump-sum subsidies, Subt . In order to guarantee stability, at
least one instrument must react to the debt-to-GDP ratio (positively for revenue instru-
ments, negatively for expenditure instruments). As the literature shows, it generally
suffices to assume a small and inertial responsiveness of the chosen instrument(s) to
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deviations in the debt ratio (see Bohn 1998). In principle, the government could use
all the instruments to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio separately or use any mix of the
instruments. As we are primarily interested in the “pure” effects of the labor market
reforms in the analysis to follow, we assume that the government uses lump-sum taxes
as the fiscal instrument to avoid distortions stemming from the fiscal side.7 Hence,

















+ Tt , (37)
where Tt represents a potential iid shock, ρT is a smoothing parameter and φT the
fiscal authority’s stance of debt deviations from target. All other fiscal instruments are
treated as constants.
2.5 The foreign country block, international linkages and union-wide monetary
policy
In this section, we will describe some structural relationships corresponding to the
foreign country block, point out the international linkages via trade in goods and
foreign assets, and describe the union-wide monetary policy rule.
2.5.1 The foreign country
We use asterisks to denote decisions made by foreign agents as well as structural
parameters in the foreign country. The latter is modelled analogously to the home
country. For this reason, here we discuss only some structural relationships, while the
full set of equations corresponding to the foreign country is analogous to the home
country.







1 − ω + ψ∗
)1−ω+ψ∗
,
for i = o, r , where ci∗At and ci∗Bt denote consumption by foreign type-i households of
goods produced in country A (home) and B (foreign), respectively, while ψ∗ captures
the degree of home bias in foreign households’ preferences. The foreign country’s
investment basket is analogously defined. Remembering that we assume the law of
one price, the corresponding consumer price index in the foreign country (which is
7 Were we to use, for example, labor income taxes instead, we would introduce additional effects stemming
from the fact that those taxes distort the economy. To avoid this, and to focus only on the pure effect of the
labor market reform, we chose lump-sum taxes as the instrument. A decrease (increase) in lump-sum taxes
can be interpreted as additional fiscal leeway (shortage) induced by the labor market reform.
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where πBt ≡ PBt/PBt−1 is producer price inflation in the foreign country. The PPI



















where P˜Bt is the common nominal price chosen by the foreign country’s price-setters in
period t . Also, the nominal interest rate paid/received by the foreign country’s nationals
on international bonds equals Recbt exp
(−ψd (d∗t − d¯∗) /Y ∗t ), where (−) d∗t /Y ∗t is the
foreign country’s ratio of net foreign debt over output.
2.5.2 International linkages
As already mentioned, international linkages between the two countries result from
trade in goods and services as well as from trading in international bonds. The home
country’s net foreign asset position, expressed in terms of PPI, evolves according to:
dt =
Recbt−1 · e−ψd (dt−1−d¯)/Yt−1
πAt
· dt−1 + 1 − ω
ω
(
C∗At + I ∗At




where (1 − ω) (C∗At + I ∗At)/ω are real per capita exports and pBt (CBt + IBt ) are real
per capita imports. Zero net supply of international bonds implies:
ωdt + (1 − ω)pBt d∗t = 0. (39)
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2.5.3 Equilibrium in goods markets and GDP
Market clearing implies that private per capita production in the home and foreign
country, Yt and Y ∗t respectively, is used for private and public consumption as well as
private and public investment demand,




C∗At + I ∗At
)
,
Y ∗t = C∗Bt + I ∗Bt + Cg∗t + I g∗t +
ω
1 − ω(CBt + IBt ).
Consistently with national accounting, each country’s GDP is the sum of private-sector
production and government production of goods and services. The latter is measured
at input costs, that is, by the gross government wage bill. Let Y tott and Y
tot,∗
t denote
real (PPI-deflated) per capita GDP in the home and foreign country, respectively. We
then have:
Y tott = Yt + (1 + τ sct )wgt N gt p1−ω−ψBt , (41)
Y tot,∗t = Y ∗t + (1 + τ sc∗t )wg∗t N g∗t p−(ω−ψ
∗)
Bt , (42)




We assume that the area-wide monetary authority has its nominal interest rate, Recbt ,
respond to deviations of area-wide CPI inflation from its long-run target, π¯ , and to
























where ρR is a smoothing parameter, φπ and φy are the monetary policy’s stance on
inflation and output growth, respectively. This completes the model description. We
now turn to the model calibration.
2.6 Calibration
In calibrating our model, we strongly rely on Stähler and Thomas (2012). This means
that the model is calibrated to Spain (country A) and the rest of EMU (country B) at
quarterly frequencies. Spain’s country size is set to ω = 0.10, which roughly corre-
sponds to Spain’s population share in the EMU, while the remaining parameters are
calibrated as follows. Some parameters are chosen such that the model’s deterministic
steady state replicates a number of long-run targets in the data. These long-run targets
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for Spain and for the rest of EMU are displayed in Table 1. The data comes from the
European Commission (AMECO and Public Finance Report—2010), Eurostat (NEW
CRONOS), Spain’s Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA) and the OECD (see http://
www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives). From this, we set the steady-state shares
of different government spending-to-GDP ratios and calculate implicit tax as well as
unemployment rates. For the sake of brevity, readers interested in a precise description
and derivation are referred to the calibration section in Stähler and Thomas (2012).
Steady state values of endogenous variables are indicated by bars.
The rest of the parameters are set according to microeconomic evidence as well
as following the literature. A summary of all structural parameters can be found in
Table 2. Again, this closely follows Stähler and Thomas (2012) and the reader is
referred to there for further details. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we assume a
symmetric calibration between the home and foreign country.
Given the extension of the model, i.e. the inclusion of endogenous job destruction,
we have to change calibration partly to still meet the targets we are aiming at. However,
this only applies to few parameters that have to be calculated “endogenously” in order
to meet the targets. Those parameters set according to microeconomic evidence and
literature remain as in Stähler and Thomas (2012). The necessary changes are described
in more detail in the following. Regarding the log-normal distribution of idiosyncratic
productivity, log(ht ) ∼ N (μh, σh), we follow Costain et al. (2010) and Thomas and
Zanetti (2009), who calibrate their models to Spain and the euro area, respectively. This
implies that we set μh = μ∗h = 0, implying Et (ht ) = 1, and σh = σ ∗h = 0.25.8 We
stick to the assumption that total steady-state dismissal probability in the private sector
is s¯ p = 0.06, while the probability in the public sector is half of that in the private
sector, sg = 1/2 · s¯ p = 0.03. In the present setup with endogenous job destruction,
we now have to determine the exogenous dismissal probability in the private sector,
too. Given the interpretation that this may refer to the retirement decision, we set
sx = sg = 0.03. With this, we are able to calculate the endogenous private-sector
dismissal probability as s¯n = (s¯ p − sx )/(1 − sx ) = F( ¯˜h), from which we are able
to derive the corresponding productivity threshold for firms, i.e. ¯˜h = F−1(·) in the
steady state. For the firing costs, we assume that they amount to 30 % of the quarterly
average real wage in Spain, i.e. κF = 0.3 · w¯ p, and to 20 % in the rest of EMU, i.e.
κF,∗ = 0.2 · w¯ p,∗ (see Thomas and Zanetti 2009, for discussion). As in Stähler and





e and private-sector vacancy posting costs κ
p
v as well as the corresponding
foreign country counterparts, have to be derived “endogenously” to meet the targets.
Here, we have to derive unemployment benefits κ B from the steady-sate JD equation
in order to meet the endogenous dismissal rate, too. All these “endogenously derived”
parameter values differ somewhat from those in Stähler and Thomas (2012), but not
significantly. Despite the changes, we are still able to analytically solve for the model’s
deterministic steady state.
8 Given the lack of micro evidence on this latter parameter, we additionally conduct robustness analyses
by considering four different values of σh : 0.20, 0.30, 0.40 and 0.50. The results we derive are not changed
qualitatively.
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Table 1 Targeted values
Target Symbol Value
Home country (Spain)
PPI inflation π¯A 1.0000
Current account d¯ = −d¯∗ 0.0000
(Average) Labor income tax rate τ¯w 0.1622
Bond tax rate τ¯b 0.1622
VAT rate τ¯ c 0.0762
Social security contribution rate τ¯ sc 0.1555
Capital tax rate τ¯ k 0.1806
Unemployment rate U¯ 0.1113
Fraction of publ. employment f racpub = N¯ g
1−U¯ 0.1872
Vacancy filling rate (private) q¯ p 0.7000
Vacancy filling rate (public) q¯g 0.8000
Gov. SS spending ωG = G¯/Y¯ tot 0.2131
Gov. SS purchases ωCg = C¯g/Y¯ tot 0.0756
Gov. SS investment ωIg = I¯ g/Y¯ tot 0.0355
SS debt-to-annual-GDP ratio ωb = p¯1−ω−ψB b¯/(4Y¯ tot ) 0.4831
SS subsidy-to-GDP ratio ωs = p¯1−ω−ψB ¯Sub/Y¯ tot 0.1543
Foreign country (rest of EMU)
(Average) Labor income tax rate τ¯w∗ 0.2225
Bond tax rate τ¯b∗ 0.1267
VAT rate τ¯ c∗ 0.0995
Social security contribution rate τ¯ sc∗ 0.1706
Capital tax rate τ¯ k∗ 0.0704
Unemployment rate U¯∗ 0.0844
Fraction of publ. employment f racpub∗ = N¯ g∗
1−U¯∗ 0.1814
Vacancy filling rate (private) q¯ p∗ 0.7000
Vacancy filling rate (public) q¯g∗ 0.8000
Gov. SS spending ωG∗ = G¯∗/Y¯ tot∗ 0.2256
Gov. SS purchases ωCg∗ = C¯g∗/Y¯ tot∗ 0.0985
Gov. SS investment ωIg∗ = I¯ g∗/Y¯ tot∗ 0.0238
SS debt-to-GDP ratio (annualized) ωb∗ = ( p¯∗B)−(ω−ψ∗) b¯∗/(4Y¯ tot∗) 0.6896
SS subsidy-to-GDP ratio ωs∗ = ( p¯∗B)−(ω−ψ∗) ¯Sub∗/Y¯ tot∗ 0.2126
Sources: Original data from European Commission, Eurostat and OECD, own calculations for the ratios
and implicit tax rates; normalization as described in Stähler and Thomas (2012)
3 Analysis
In this section, we first describe the simulation design and then discuss the short
and long-run results, respectively. Here, it seems worthwhile noting that our calibra-
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Table 2 Baseline parameter calibration
Parameter Symbol Value
Relative size of home country ω 0.1
Monetary policy
Interest rate smoothing ρR 0.9
Stance on inflation φπ 1.5
Stance on output gap φy 0.5
Fiscal policy
Lump-sum tax smoothing ρT = ρ∗T 0
Stance on debt (lump-sum tax) φT = φ∗T 0.9
Price stickiness
Calvo parameter (prices) θP 0.75
Market power (markup)  6
Trade in international bonds
Risk premium parameter ψ2 = ψ∗2 0.01
Preferences
Share of RoT consumers μ 0.4
Discount rate β 0.99
Risk aversion σc 2
Habits in consumption h 0.85
Home bias ψ ; ψ∗ 0.56; 0.03
Production
Private-sector capital depreciation δk 0.025
Public-sector capital depreciation δg 0.025
Private-sector capital share in prod. α 0.4
Public-sector capital influence in prod. η 0.015
Adjustment cost parameter κI 2.48
TFP scaling parameter a; a∗ 0.42; 0.44
Idiosyncratic productivity shock
Mean μh ⇒ E{ht } = 1 0
Standard deviation σh 0.25
Labor market
Matching elasticity (private sector) ϕ p 0.5
Matching elasticity (public sector) ϕg 0.3
Separation rate (public sector) sg 0.03
Ex separation rate (private sector) sx 0.03
Bargaining power ξ 0.5
Private-sector matching efficiency κ pe ; κ p∗e 0.44; 0.48
Public-sector sector matching efficiency κge ; κg∗e 0.30; 0.32
Vacancy posting costs κ pv = κgv ; κ p,∗v = κg,∗v 0.15; 0.12
Unemployment benefits κB ; κ∗B 0.45; 0.28
Dismissal costs κF ; κF,∗ 0.21; 0.10
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tion reproduces a downward-sloping Beveridge curve and also a negative correlation
between job creation and job destruction to standard shocks.9 Hence, the results we
discuss below do not result from the fact that, sometimes, DSGE models with frictional
labor markets and endogenous job destruction fail to reproduce these features (see,
for example, Fujita and Ramey 2005, for a more detailed discussion of this issue).
3.1 Simulation design
As discussed in the introduction, the Spanish government announced or implemented
measures to reform the labor market in order, first, to foster wage moderation and,
second, to make the labor market more flexible. All the measures are supposed to help
regain international competitiveness. More precisely, the Spanish government already
decreased public wages and employment, which yields a reduction in the workers’
outside option in private wage negotiations. Another—from our model perspective
somewhat analogous—measure to achieve this is a cut in unemployment benefits. The
government announced it will reform the bargaining system and cut dismissal costs in
its recent Stability Programme 2011 as well as the National Reform Programme 2011.
In our model, we implement these measures as follows. In line with Zanetti (2011),
we assume a permanent ex-ante 5 % points decrease in firing costs (from 30 % of
average real wages to 25 %) and in the replacement ratio (i.e. unemployment benefits
form about 67.9–62.9 % of average real wages). We also simulate a permanent ex-ante
5 % point reduction in the union’s bargaining power (from 50 to 45 %). It is important
to note that these changes imply changes in many economic variables such that, from
the ex-post perspective (i.e. in the new steady state), firing costs, for example, may be
higher or lower than 25 % of average real wages because the latter may have changed.
Regarding the cut in public-sector wages, we refer the reader to Stähler and Thomas
(2012) for a more detailed discussion of the effects at work to save space and because
the effects are perfectly analogous to a model without exogenous job destruction.10
We also discuss a 5 % decrease in public employment in the present paper.
As structural changes in labor market parameters imply changes in many other
economic variables on the transition to the new steady state, and in the new steady
state itself, public balances also change. For example, if labor market reforms yield
an increase of domestic consumption, consumption tax revenues increase, implying
that debt can be decreased. A lower level of debt means lower interest payments on
outstanding debt, so the government may have additional leeway to further cut taxes
or increase expenditures. Should the labor market reform deteriorate public finances,
the opposite is true, of course. In order to guarantee stability of the system without
9 Including shock processes broadly in line with those estimated by Andrés et al. (2010), we find the
correlation between vacancies and unemployment to be ρ(v pt ,Ut ) = −0.48 on the aggregate level. For
the dismissal threshold and vacancy posting, the correlation is ρ(p pt , h˜t ) = −0.99. These values are also
similar to those reported in Thomas and Zanetti (2009).
10 Except some slight variations in the GDP movements resulting from the definition of GDP, which
includes the public sector wage bill in our model, the effects are also analogous to a cut in unemployment
benefits. We show the latter simulation in this paper. To prove our claim, we provide the corresponding
graphs of the wage simulation in the Appendix of the working paper version of this paper (Schwarzmüller
and Stähler 2011).
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introducing additional distortions, we assume that the government uses lump-sum
taxes to take care of these effects. We already discussed the issue in Sect. 2.4. In the
next subsection, we analyze the effects of the above mentioned labor market reforms
in more detail.
3.2 Simulation results
We start off by analyzing the short-run effects of the measures discussed above. Here,
we plot the dynamic responses for the first 20 quarters after the measure has been
conducted. At the end of this subsection, we discuss the long-run implications of the
labor market reforms and have a look at the spillovers to the rest of EMU.
3.2.1 Dynamic effects
To get started, it seems appropriate to first have a look at the most intuitive reform,
the cut in unemployment benefits. Figure 1 plots the dynamic responses for selected
variables. A cut in unemployment benefits deteriorates the workers’ outside option
such that wages fall, which implies that job destruction—shown as the endogenous
dismissal rate in the lowest-left panel of Fig. 1—also falls because maintaining a
worker becomes more attractive due to lower labor costs. This, in turn, means that
the expected value of a newly created job increases because the expected job duration
rises. Hence, the job finding probability for workers increases. Less job destruction
and higher job creation generate more employment and unemployment falls. Lower
labor costs also allow firms to reduce prices, which improves the terms of trade, fosters
demand for Spanish goods in the rest of EMU and, thus, increases exports. Internal
demand also increases because of improvements in fiscal balances and the resulting
positive wealth effect. RoT-consumers, however, consume less. This is because the
drop in wages cannot be compensated for by the increase in the employment level.
Nevertheless, optimizers, for whom the wealth effect is relevant, eventually dominate
the private consumption pattern.11 Imports initially fall because Spanish goods become
relatively cheaper, but the higher internal demand eventually pushes real imports up.
Because Spain is relatively small, the price changes in Spain lead to only modest
reactions of the ECB rate as well as the interest rate on domestic bonds. The higher
product demand is satisfied by higher output and GDP.
A cut in public wages yields similar effects, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
The only difference is that, now, the workers’ outside option is diminished by the
fact that, when finding a public-sector job, its remuneration is lower (see Stähler and
Thomas 2012). As Fig. 2 reveals, cutting the union’s bargaining power implies anal-
ogous qualitative effects because of the wage decrease resulting from less bargaining
power; however, at a quantitatively lower level. In this regard, it is interesting to note
that, when assuming a two-tier wage contract—i.e. different wages for continuing
11 We use the word “dominate” as a short-cut. To be more precise, optimizers “foresee” a future income
increase. When the increase is realized, RoTs will respond, too (more precisely, this reasoning is correct when
optimizers are responding to wealth effects, but not when they are responding to intertemporal substitution
effects).
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and newly hired workers as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) or Zanetti (2011)—,
we can observed higher job creation and destruction following a cut in the workers’
bargaining power. This is because the two-tier wage structure increases the incentive
for firms to lay off relatively unproductive workers in continuing job to hire new, more
productive ones. Readers interested in more details on this effect are referred to the
working paper version of this paper (Schwarzmüller and Stähler 2011).12
The effects of a decrease in firing costs—another more or less standard issue
in labor market analyses (see, for example, Mortensen and Pissarides 1999, 2003;
or Stähler 2007, Chap. 3, for an overview of the literature)—are summarized in
Fig. 3. Because dismissals become cheaper, firms are more inclined to lay off a worker
and, thus, the reservation threshold h˜t increases. Nevertheless, the expected costs of
getting rid of a worker once hired also decrease, inducing firms to create more vacan-
cies. Because the latter effect always dominates, job creation rises. Formally, this
can be seen in the JC, Eq. (32). Those are standard effects in the literature, leaving
the effects on unemployment ambiguous from a purely theoretical perspective. Our
simulation suggests that unemployment increases, which is quite robust to alternative
parameterizations of the model.
When firing costs are decreased, the union demands lower wages because they
take into account that, were they to demand higher wages, firms would dismiss them
even earlier given the already increase dismissal probability due to lower dismissal
costs. Higher unemployment deteriorates fiscal balances generating a negative wealth
effect for optimizers inducing them to decrease consumption. Lower wages make
RoTs do the same. This implies that demand and output decrease. Initially, the wage
decrease allows firms to reduce prices, which, on impact, somewhat improves the
terms of trade. Imports fall while exports are virtually unaffected. After the first firing
round resulting from lower dismissal costs, both job creation and destruction stabilize
at higher levels implying higher job turnover at a lower employment level. Even
though average productivity per employed worker increases due to the higher dismissal
threshold, labor input for intermediate goods producing firms falls, increasing the
marginal product of labor, xt . This eventually holds for the capital interest rate, rkt ,
too, which then increases marginal costs and induces firms to increase prices, setting
in train the eventual deterioration of the terms of trade and the decrease in exports.
Still, interest rates barely move due to Spain’s small size within EMU.
Summing up, we learn from our analysis that decreasing employment protection to
foster international competitiveness may not work—at least not as easily as is often
claimed in policy reports which frequently state this to be an option without further
detailing the issue. At first glance, this may seem surprising, as a more flexible labor
market is generally assumed to go hand-in-hand with higher production and interna-
tional competitiveness. Note, however, that this result does fit into the literature as
“on the whole, there is no strong evidence suggesting that reducing EPL (employment
protection legislation) would lessen or prevent excessive imbalances in the EU” (see
12 This effect does not hinge on the assumption that newly hired workers have maximum productivity.
Their productivity must just be somewhat higher than dismissal productivity, which seems a reasonable
assumption given that, otherwise, no job creation will take place at all. In the working paper version,
Schwarzmüller and Stähler (2011), we also provide the graphs for a reduction in public-sector wages.
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IMF 2011, p. 87 and the literature discussed therein). Furthermore, two more theo-
retical remarks also seem in order. First, as has been shown in Stähler (2008), when
talking about the effects of employment protection on unemployment in matching
labor market frameworks, the bargaining structure itself matters. In the model at hand,
we more or less follow the conventional approach. It is not unlikely, however, that
altering the bargaining game between unions and firms would alter our findings. For
example, in the model by Stähler (2008), employment protection is indeed responsible
for higher wage claims and higher unemployment rates. Second, Spain is character-
ized by a highly dual labor market consisting of (potentially less productive) insiders
who enjoy a high degree of employment protection, and outsiders who have barely
none. Breaking this dual labor market structure and decreasing the average level of
employment protection—but augmenting it for some—may be a way to go. For an
analysis in this direction, see Costain et al. (2010). Overall, further research on this
topic in general equilibrium models is certainly in order.
Figure 4 summarizes the dynamic effects of a cut in public employment. Note that
the cut is, in contrast to the other reforms, gradual.13 However, this does not affect
the long-run results at all, and the short-run effects do not change qualitatively (see
Stähler and Thomas 2012, too). We see that, while the effects on private production,
private consumption, wages, prices, the terms of trade and fiscal balances are—except
in size—analogous to those of a reduction in unemployment benefits or public wages,
there are notable differences in the dynamics of GDP, employment and the firms’
hiring and firing decisions. This is the case mainly for two reasons. First, the effect
on GDP is due to the definition of real GDP itself, namely the sum of private produc-
tion and government production (measured as the public sector wage bill). The latter
falls when dismissing public-sector workers. Second, and probably more interesting,
are the dynamics of the labor market and the resulting multiplier-diminishing effects.
When cutting public-sector employment, the probability of finding a public-sector job
decreases, which yields a drop in the workers’ average wage claims. On impact, this
increases the probability of unemployed workers finding a job in the private sector
because lower wages foster the incentive for private job creation. Nevertheless, higher
private job creation does not compensate for the lower public-sector labor demand
and, thus, the private-sector job finding probability eventually falls. To some extent,
the decrease in public-sector employment can be interpreted as an “unemployment
shock” increasing the number of unemployed workers in the economy. We see this by
the simultaneous increase of the unemployment rate and the private-sector employ-
ment rate in Fig. 4. Furthermore—and in addition to a model with only exogenous
(private) job destruction as in Stähler and Thomas (2012)—we see that private-sector
job destruction increases (after a short drop on impact). Because of the “unemploy-
ment shock”, it now pays for firms to dismiss a relatively unproductive worker, pay
13 Given our assumption of exogenous separations in the public sector, which is arguably the most realistic
one in the case of the government sector, it is physically impossible to implement such a reduction imme-
diately. To see this, consider the law of motion of government employment, N gt = (1 − sg)N gt−1 + pgt U˜t .
The largest possible percentage reduction in employment, which happens when gross hirings pgt U˜t drop to
zero, is given by sg , which equals 3 % under our calibration. Therefore, even under an extreme policy of
complete hiring freeze, the required employment reduction would still have to be implemented gradually.
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the search costs and hire a new, more productive, one as average search duration
(from the firms’ perspective) has fallen to a sufficient extent for such a behavior
to pay off. Given the differences in the effects on the labor market—especially, the
“unemployment shock”—, it is no longer surprising that the effects on the other vari-
ables (such as private production, prices, consumptions, and the terms of trade) turn
out to be much smaller than when cutting unemployment benefits or public-sector
wages.
3.2.2 Long-run effects
In Table 3, we present the steady-sate effects of the labor market reforms discussed in
the previous subsection on selected home-country variables, while Table 4 shows the
long-run spillovers of these reforms to the rest of EMU. The tables present percentage
deviations from the initial steady state (percentage point deviations as indicated).
The long-run effects are the result of both the permanent labor market reform and
the long-run impact on lump-sum taxes. As lump-sum taxes introduce no further
distortions in the system, they can be interpreted as the fiscal leeway (if negative)
or the fiscal shortage (if positive) resulting from the reform. We discussed this issue
above.
Comparing the long-run results in Table 3, we find that measures aiming at reducing
the workers’ (policy-induced) outside option such as the decrease in unemployment
benefits κ B and public wages w¯g , followed by a decrease in the union’s bargaining
power ζ , is most beneficial for improving output, employment and the terms of trade.
Aggregate internal and external demand rises. It also generates, by far, the largest lee-
way for fiscal balances. The reason is that, by reducing the workers’ (policy-induced)
Table 3 Long-run results of different labor market reforms on Spanish economy
Reduction in κ B κF ξ w¯g N¯ g
Effect on
Real GDP 2.59 −0.24 1.29 1.87 −0.01
Real private-sector output 2.78 −0.26 1.40 2.56 0.54
Real priv cons (total) 2.39 −0.23 1.20 2.20 0.47
Real priv cons (optimizers) 3.97 −0.22 1.89 3.47 0.83
Real priv cons (RoTs) −1.11 −0.23 −0.31 −0.60 −0.34
Real private investment 1.88 −0.18 0.94 1.73 0.37
Unemployment −3.52 0.71 −1.75 −3.23 0.41
End dismissal rate −1.72 0.86 −0.88 −1.60 0.10
Job finding prob 1.64 1.22 0.67 1.45 −0.21
Av private real wage −1.30 −0.13 −0.65 −1.20 −0.30
Terms of trade 2.64 −0.24 1.32 2.43 0.52
Lump-sum taxes −11.75 2.40 −5.26 −12.04 −1.96
Notes: the table shows percentage deviations from initial steady state (percentage point deviations for
unemployment rates as well as dismissal and job finding probabilities)
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Table 4 Long-run spillovers of different labor market reforms on rest of EMU
Reduction in κ B κF ξ w¯g N¯ g
Effect on
Real GDP 0.38 −0.04 0.19 0.35 0.08
Real private-sector output 0.45 −0.04 0.23 0.41 0.09
Real priv cons (total) 0.72 −0.07 0.37 0.67 0.14
Real priv cons (optimizers) 0.82 −0.08 0.42 0.76 0.16
Real priv cons (RoTs) 0.39 −0.04 0.20 0.37 0.08
Real private investment 0.63 −0.06 0.32 0.58 0.12
Unemployment −0.35 0.04 −0.18 −0.33 −0.07
End dismissal rate −0.19 0.02 −0.10 −0.18 −0.04
Job finding prob 0.31 −0.03 0.15 0.28 0.06
Av private real wage 0.32 −0.03 0.17 0.30 0.07
Lump-sum taxes −0.96 0.09 −0.49 −0.88 −0.19
Notes: the table shows percentage deviations from initial steady state (percentage point deviations for
unemployment rates as well as dismissal and job finding probabilities)
outside option, wage claims fall and Spanish goods become relatively cheaper. At the
same time, fiscal balances benefit from reducing expenditures, which gives room to
additionally reduce taxation because of lower steady-state debt levels further boosting
demand. However, it is also evident that RoT-households do not benefit from these
measures because the wage drop dominates the rise in employment such that their
steady-state consumption possibilities deteriorate while optimizers benefit from the
positive wealth effect. The argument also holds for a decrease in public employment,
however, to a lesser extent and not for unemployment. This is due, first, to the defi-
nition of GDP and, second, to the “unemployment shock”; both are described in the
previous section.
Decreasing dismissal costs κF does not improve the labor market situation, as the
increase in the dismissal probability dominates the rise in job creation. Neither does
it increase output nor the terms of trade. The reason is, as we have already described
in the previous section, that higher marginal costs make firms raise prices. Therefore,
terms of trade deteriorate. Reforming the employment protection legislation may not
be the most suitable measure when planning to improve international competitive-
ness. However, to draw some important policy conclusions, discussing employment
protection legislation reforms most likely deserves a more sophisticated labor mar-
ket modelling than the one we have offered in the model at hand (see, for example,
Stähler 2007, for an overview of the literature on employment protection and some
applications of the matching model).
In Table 4, we report the effects the measures conducted in Spain have on the rest
of EMU. There are at least three findings worth pointing out. First, whenever the
measure raises private-sector output in Spain, it does so for the rest of EMU, too.
At first sight, this may be surprising because one might guess that an increase in
Spain’s international competitiveness resulting from these labor market reforms may
harm other member countries. However, the resulting additional demand for foreign
123
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goods in Spain overcompensates for the loss in competitiveness faced by the rest of
EMU countries vis-á-vis Spain, at least on an aggregate level.14 Second, all measures
beneficial for Spain improve the labor market situation in the rest of EMU. The reason
is that the additional demand for foreign goods in Spain is produced by more labor
input there, too. Given the improvement in the labor market, yielding (slightly) higher
wages, too, we note that, third, liquidity-constrained RoT-consumers do not lose from
the reforms in Spain—in contrast to the situation in the reforming country itself.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have used an extended version of “FiMod—A DSGE Model for Fis-
cal Policy Simulations” (Stähler and Thomas 2012) with endogenous job destruction
decisions by private firms to analyze the effects of permanent cuts in unemployment
benefits, public-sector employment and wages, employment protection and the unions’
bargaining power on output, employment, international competitiveness and fiscal bal-
ances inspired by the current discussion on labor market reforms in Spain. FiMod is
a medium-scale two-country monetary union DSGE model with quite a comprehen-
sive fiscal block. Furthermore, it includes the modern theory of unemployment by
assuming a frictional labor market.
We find that measures decreasing the policy-induced outside option of workers, such
as a cut in unemployment benefits or public wages, seems to be the most effective way
to increase output, employment and international competitiveness while, at the same
time, improving fiscal balances. The reason is that the effect on the reservation wage
feeds through to private-sector wage bargaining almost immediately, while, at the
same time, fiscal balances are also directly affected. The same argument holds for cuts
in public-sector employment, albeit at a lower level, because the increase in private
labor demand cannot compensate for the loss in public-sector employment. Cuts in
the unions’ bargaining power also achieve the goal of improving competitiveness,
output and employment, however, at a lower level. A cut in employment protection
does not seem to be an adequate measure to regain international competitiveness.
Lower employment protection yields less job security, which may induce workers to
demand even higher wages, thereby deteriorating international competitiveness rather
than improving it.
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